The vague wording of some so-called "constructive ambiguities"[8] helped ensure the adoption of the agreement and delayed debate on some of the most controversial issues. These include extra-military dismantling, police reform and the standardisation of Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland`s leaders face difficult challenges in providing basic services and managing denominational divisions. One of the most urgent tasks is to improve health services, which have become increasingly mired in crisis after the collapse of local authorities. About three hundred thousand people - about one-sixth of the population - were on waiting lists for health care by the end of 2019, and nurses and other employees went on strike in December of that year to protest lower wages than the rest of the UK. Until February 2020, many health unions had agreed with the government on higher wages and other demands on whether the health sector was on a sustainable path but remains open. 20 All this shows some important features of the current Irish border conundrum. First, it is not just an economic and commercial problem, but a highly political and constitutional one. A purely economic and technical solution to the economic dimension of the problem is, by its very nature, irrelevant.

The second conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the current problem at the Irish border is not a new issue, which would only be a consequence of the June 2016 Brexit referendum. Although the decision taken by a majority of voters in the United Kingdom destabilizes the current regime of the soft Irish border on the island of Ireland, the main causes of the difficulties encountered with the Irish border lie in the weaknesses of the GFA itself. If there is a problem today with the Irish border, it is mainly because the GFA has not provided real and long-term political solutions to the historic dispute over the very status of the Irish division limit set between 1920 and 1925. The Brexit referendum itself is a sign that the Irish and British states have not yet defined the precise and agreed constitutional conditions of their common sovereignty over Northern Ireland. If so, the decision to hold the 2016 referendum, confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, shows that, in accordance with the British Constitution, the London Executive rightly regarded Northern Ireland as an integral part of British territory and not as an area of common sovereignty with Dublin. Despite the GFA, the British Constitution remains a strictly unionist constitution. With regard to Northern Ireland`s internal institutions, the situation following the Brexit referendum showed that despite an inter-communal majority of 56% for remains and despite a common interest in maintaining an open border, both communities still maintain their ancestral denominational views across the border.

The vague wording of some so-called "constructive ambiguities"[8] helped ensure the adoption of the agreement and delayed debate on some of the most controversial issues. These include extra-military dismantling, police reform and the standardisation of Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland`s leaders face difficult challenges in providing basic services and managing denominational divisions. One of the most urgent tasks is to improve health services, which have become increasingly mired in crisis after the collapse of local authorities. About three hundred thousand people - about one-sixth of the population - were on waiting lists for health care by the end of 2019, and nurses and other employees went on strike in December of that year to protest lower wages than the rest of the UK. Until February 2020, many health unions had agreed with the government on higher wages and other demands on whether the health sector was on a sustainable path but remains open. 20 All this shows some important features of the current Irish border conundrum. First, it is not just an economic and commercial problem, but a highly political and constitutional one. A purely economic and technical solution to the economic dimension of the problem is, by its very nature, irrelevant.

The second conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the current problem at the Irish border is not a new issue, which would only be a consequence of the June 2016 Brexit referendum. Although the decision taken by a majority of voters in the United Kingdom destabilizes the current regime of the soft Irish border on the island of Ireland, the main causes of the difficulties encountered with the Irish border lie in the weaknesses of the GFA itself. If there is a problem today with the Irish border, it is mainly because the GFA has not provided real and long-term political solutions to the historic dispute over the very status of the Irish division limit set between 1920 and 1925. The Brexit referendum itself is a sign that the Irish and British states have not yet defined the precise and agreed constitutional conditions of their common sovereignty over Northern Ireland. If so, the decision to hold the 2016 referendum, confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, shows that, in accordance with the British Constitution, the London Executive rightly regarded Northern Ireland as an integral part of British territory and not as an area of common sovereignty with Dublin. Despite the GFA, the British Constitution remains a strictly unionist constitution. With regard to Northern Ireland`s internal institutions, the situation following the Brexit referendum showed that despite an inter-communal majority of 56% for remains and despite a common interest in maintaining an open border, both communities still maintain their ancestral denominational views across the border.

The vague wording of some so-called "constructive ambiguities"[8] helped ensure the adoption of the agreement and delayed debate on some of the most controversial issues. These include extra-military dismantling, police reform and the standardisation of Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland`s leaders face difficult challenges in providing basic services and managing denominational divisions. One of the most urgent tasks is to improve health services, which have become increasingly mired in crisis after the collapse of local authorities. About three hundred thousand people - about one-sixth of the population - were on waiting lists for health care by the end of 2019, and nurses and other employees went on strike in December of that year to protest lower wages than the rest of the UK. Until February 2020, many health unions had agreed with the government on higher wages and other demands on whether the health sector was on a sustainable path but remains open. 20 All this shows some important features of the current Irish border conundrum. First, it is not just an economic and commercial problem, but a highly political and constitutional one. A purely economic and technical solution to the economic dimension of the problem is, by its very nature, irrelevant.

The second conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the current problem at the Irish border is not a new issue, which would only be a consequence of the June 2016 Brexit referendum. Although the decision taken by a majority of voters in the United Kingdom destabilizes the current regime of the soft Irish border on the island of Ireland, the main causes of the difficulties encountered with the Irish border lie in the weaknesses of the GFA itself. If there is a problem today with the Irish border, it is mainly because the GFA has not provided real and long-term political solutions to the historic dispute over the very status of the Irish division limit set between 1920 and 1925. The Brexit referendum itself is a sign that the Irish and British states have not yet defined the precise and agreed constitutional conditions of their common sovereignty over Northern Ireland. If so, the decision to hold the 2016 referendum, confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, shows that, in accordance with the British Constitution, the London Executive rightly regarded Northern Ireland as an integral part of British territory and not as an area of common sovereignty with Dublin. Despite the GFA, the British Constitution remains a strictly unionist constitution. With regard to Northern Ireland`s internal institutions, the situation following the Brexit referendum showed that despite an inter-communal majority of 56% for remains and despite a common interest in maintaining an open border, both communities still maintain their ancestral denominational views across the border.

The vague wording of some so-called "constructive ambiguities"[8] helped ensure the adoption of the agreement and delayed debate on some of the most controversial issues. These include extra-military dismantling, police reform and the standardisation of Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland`s leaders face difficult challenges in providing basic services and managing denominational divisions. One of the most urgent tasks is to improve health services, which have become increasingly mired in crisis after the collapse of local authorities. About three hundred thousand people - about one-sixth of the population - were on waiting lists for health care by the end of 2019, and nurses and other employees went on strike in December of that year to protest lower wages than the rest of the UK. Until February 2020, many health unions had agreed with the government on higher wages and other demands on whether the health sector was on a sustainable path but remains open. 20 All this shows some important features of the current Irish border conundrum. First, it is not just an economic and commercial problem, but a highly political and constitutional one. A purely economic and technical solution to the economic dimension of the problem is, by its very nature, irrelevant.

The second conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the current problem at the Irish border is not a new issue, which would only be a consequence of the June 2016 Brexit referendum. Although the decision taken by a majority of voters in the United Kingdom destabilizes the current regime of the soft Irish border on the island of Ireland, the main causes of the difficulties encountered with the Irish border lie in the weaknesses of the GFA itself. If there is a problem today with the Irish border, it is mainly because the GFA has not provided real and long-term political solutions to the historic dispute over the very status of the Irish division limit set between 1920 and 1925. The Brexit referendum itself is a sign that the Irish and British states have not yet defined the precise and agreed constitutional conditions of their common sovereignty over Northern Ireland. If so, the decision to hold the 2016 referendum, confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, shows that, in accordance with the British Constitution, the London Executive rightly regarded Northern Ireland as an integral part of British territory and not as an area of common sovereignty with Dublin. Despite the GFA, the British Constitution remains a strictly unionist constitution. With regard to Northern Ireland`s internal institutions, the situation following the Brexit referendum showed that despite an inter-communal majority of 56% for remains and despite a common interest in maintaining an open border, both communities still maintain their ancestral denominational views across the border.